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•  Weak institutions are the central driver of state fragility.  Other factors 
associated with fragility include: economic development, violent 
conflict, natural resources, external shocks and the international 
system.   
 
•  Each instance of fragility is unique, but there are common themes that 
can be identified to inform better responses.  There is a circular nature 
to all aspects of this discussion: drivers of fragility are often both self- 
and mutually-reinforcing. 
 
•  Just as states can be fragile in various ways, not all regimes (or 
combinations of institutions) show the same characteristics of fragility.  
Stable political systems have institutions that mutually reinforce each 
other and are therefore able to manage tensions without a population 
resorting to violence.   
 
•  The key to understanding fragility is understanding where weaknesses 
exist in a state’s institutions.  This relates to the incentives governing 
the behaviour of social groups, particularly those with political power.  
Academic research has shown that power selection mechanisms, 
control on a state’s executive, and public participation in political 
processes are the three main components that explain institutional 
weakness. 
 
•  States whose political systems and institutions are in some form of 
transition are more likely to show signs of fragility.  This may be due to 
frustrated expectations amongst a population previously accustomed to 
higher levels of service delivery or more opportunity for political 
participation. 
 
•  Economic factors have significant impact on state fragility but their 
effects are generally less significant than the strength of a state’s 
institutions.  Economic development is not a prerequisite for preventing 
fragility, but a lack of growth will mean that institution building is more 
difficult than otherwise. 
 
•  Natural resources, ethnic composition and a colonial heritage do not in 
themselves drive fragility.  Rather, it is the political manipulation of 
these factors that can impact on state stability.  This manipulation is 
more likely in states with weak institutions. 
 
•  Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of state fragility.  However, 
it is not just an outcome of fragility, it can also be a driving factor of 
fragility, either continued or in the future.  This is due to reduced levels 
of GDP, increased strain on political institutions, and the social 
tensions that often come to prominence as a result of violent conflict. Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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•  States do not operate in isolation, yet regional drivers of fragility are 
often overlooked in responses to fragile states.  There is strong 
evidence that fragility has far reaching consequences beyond a state’s 
borders. 
 
•  The evidence suggests some important policy implications for DFID 
and other donors. Foremost is the need to support political institutions 
into the long term, beyond technical assistance and beyond short-term 
democracy and electoral interventions. There needs to be a  broader 
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I.  Introduction: what drives fragility? 
 
1.  In order to better understand fragile states, we need to know how states 
become fragile in the first place.  There is no internationally agreed 
definition of fragility but for the purposes of this paper, states are 
considered fragile when their government cannot or will not deliver the 
core functions to its people, including the poor.
1  Our definition of fragile 
states focuses on weak capacity and/or lack of political will to provide 
services and to sustain a development partnership with the international 
community.  
 
2. Fragility is essentially a dynamic process.  States may not always 
demonstrate signs of fragility; elements of fragility will be more obvious at 
some times than at others.  This paper discusses the main pressures, or 
risk factors, associated with fragility, taking into account that there is no 
simple causal process and that each case is the unique outcome of a set 
of complex chains of events and interactions.  While each context is 
different and each vulnerability distinctive, research points to a set of 
common and interrelated factors that affect, either in causing or sustaining, 
fragility.  These include: weak political institutions, economic decline, 
poverty, and violent conflict.  A state’s geography and history can also play 
a role in driving fragility.  And there are other factors, such as regional 
influences that are linked with fragility, but these require further study and 
will be examined in a separate paper.  
 
3. The focus of this paper is to look at how these factors affect a state’s 
effectiveness and strength, particularly with regards to its role in reducing 
poverty.  The paper is not intended to be an extensive academic review of 
the available literature on causes of fragility.  Instead, it is hoped that this 
paper will contribute to a better understanding of responses needed in 
fragile states.  The principal questions we seek to answer are: 
 
•  What drives fragility? 
•  What does this mean for DFID as a donor in responding to fragile 
states? 
 
4. Our conclusions represent the result of an analysis of the evidence 
examined, with reference back to the fragile state typology of willingness 
and capacity.
2  Given the diversity of ‘fragility’ under this typology, some of 
the conclusions drawn here may be rather obvious.  However, our 
assertions seek to cover the full range of fragile states, be they areas 
moving towards fragility, or those that, over time, persistently do not 
improve conditions for development. 
 
                                            
1 The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are: territorial control; safety and security; capacity to 
manage public resources; delivery of basic services; and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the 
poorest people sustain themselves.  See DFID Policy Paper (2005), “Why we need to work more effectively in fragile 
states”  
2 Moreno-Torres, M and Anderson, M (2004) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
      5
 
5. Why look at fragility?  DFID’s mandate is to promote sustainable 
development and reduce poverty with a commitment to work towards the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Fragile states contain 14% of the 
world’s population but account for nearly 30% of those living on less than 
US$ 1 a day.
3  As such, they significantly reduce the likelihood of the world 
meeting the MDGs.  State fragility can also threaten regional and global 
security, and certainly, the costs of late response to fragility are much 
higher than its prevention.  Transnational crime and the spread of disease 
will also be much harder to tackle if we ignore fragile states.  And finally, 
there is now plenty of evidence that the incidence of state fragility is likely 
to grow in the coming few years.  Thus ad-hoc, reactive, responses are 
clearly not enough.  DFID and others must work to anticipate fragility, avert 
it when possible and help post-conflict and fragile states to lay solid 
foundations for peace, good governance and development. 
 
6. In looking at the drivers of fragility, it is necessary to underline a few 
starting points:  
 
•  Our definition implies a negative view of fragility.  We make no value 
judgement on the durability of a state’s institutional set-up: political 
systems that are durable are not necessarily better for being so.   
However, fragile states, irrespective of their characteristics, are 
deemed to have negative effects on, among others, the prospects for 
poverty reduction.  
•  Incentives and expectations matter with regards to fragility, both for 
those in and outside power.  A Drivers of Change approach is crucial in 
understanding why certain groups use institutions in certain ways. In 
most instances, the primary incentive for those groups with political 
power is to maximise it, often through personal enrichment. For 
example, a government’s expectations of their longevity in power can 
influence the adoption of specific policies, which can in turn have 
consequences for other triggers of fragility.  And however long a 
political regime has survived, the incentive structure changes 
drastically if the government is expected to collapse or change soon.   
•  Drivers of fragility are often both self- and mutually-reinforcing.  Each 
instance of fragility is unique, but there are common themes that can 
be identified to promote better responses to fragile states, in particular 
focusing on preventing fragility. 
                                            
3 Branchflower et al (2004) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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7.  This paper examines each driver in turn (sections II-III), where necessary 
giving a working definition of the driver being looked at, and then setting 
out the available evidence that suggests the link to fragility.  The last 




Box 1: Some basic notions and assumptions 
Fragility 
•  In simple terms, fragility is understood here to refer to ineffective states, 
those that cannot or will not fulfil minimal functions of government. The term 
is used interchangeably with weakness and instability. 
•  The features of weakness combine in different ways and can change over 
time, but include the following: state collapse, loss of territorial control, low 
administrative capacity, political instability, conflict, pervasive corruption, 
and low acceptance of the Rule of Law. 
Political 
Instability 
•  Political instability is a contested, broad term that means different things to 
different people. It is often used to refer to political violence in a given 
country, be it severe (coup d’etats, assassinations, constitutional or regime 
changes, state failure) or more moderate (government crises, riots). 
•  Political instability is here understood as any process by which a state is 
fundamentally challenged, be it through violent conflict, or regime change. 
The assumption is that the state is a crucial element of stability. 
Drivers 
•  A driver is a factor in a process, and relates to how a new circumstance 
comes about.  For our purposes, it includes structural features (natural and 
human resources, economic and social structures), institutions (see below), 
and agents (individuals and organisations pursuing particular interests).  
•  A driver can move in either a positive or a negative direction or both: a 
driver is often self-reinforcing, so that it can cause another event, but in turn 
be influenced by that event as well. 
Political 
Institutions 
•  Political institutions are the frameworks of rules structuring the behaviour 
of, in this case, political actors that exercise, distribute and enforce political 
power.  They can be formal (national police) or informal (customary legal 
courts), state (parliaments) and non-state (NGOs) institutions, and they vary 
in scope and force. This paper focuses on formal and informal state 
institutions. 
•  Political institutions vary across countries and over time. Political 
institutions will be shaped by a wide variety of factors, including geography, 
economic development, history, culture & social norms, and by the state’s 
interactions with its neighbours and the wider world.  
•  Strong political institutions are those that can effectively constrain abuse of 
power by those in political office.  Weak institutions are those that cannot.  
‘Strong’ institutions should not be equated with ‘repressive’, but rather ‘well-
functioning’. 
Legitimacy 
•  The most authoritative governments are those that are legitimate in the 
eyes of citizens because they are in some way accountable and responsive 
to the people they represent.  
•  Legitimate regimes are those that can induce compliance without resorting 
to force and are less likely to be confronted with violent challengers. Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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II.    The central driver of fragility: weak political institutions 
 
8. This paper argues that the central driver of fragility is weak state 
institutions.  All other factors associated with fragility are in themselves 
linked to weak state institutions as a driving force.  For example, we shall 
see that poverty is certainly linked to fragility, but not all poor areas are 
necessarily fragile.  Fragility can occur when poverty or economic decline 
are  combined with the presence of weak state institutions that cannot 
manage the very real grievances caused by, for example, inequitable 
distribution of resources or unequal access to formal institutions. 
Essentially, this means that in fragile states political institutions are not 
strong enough to manage effectively the natural conflicts that occur in 
society.  This ‘fragility’ or weakness will be most evident at any time that 
the state undergoes processes of economic, political and social change. 
 
9.  The way political institutions are arranged in a state can provide a useful 
way to categorise the state’s regime or the specific form of government.  
As such, a state can be categorised as a ‘full democracy’; an ‘autocracy’; 
or as somewhere in the middle.  However, this section argues that the type 
of regime or government is not related to political stability per se.  Rather it 
is the consistency of institutions that is more important.  Strength is 
understood to mean that under diverse political and institutional 
arrangements, individuals and groups in society act in ways that serve to 
maintain the effectiveness and authority of the Rule of Law, and guard 
against abrupt challenges from within political institutions. 
 
10.  Most developing countries (and most fragile states) fall into the grey 
middle ground between quite distinct and fully-fledged political regimes of 
democracy and autocracy.
4  Therefore thinking in terms of political regimes 
is not useful when thinking about fragility.  Instead it is necessary to look in 
greater depth at how a state’s political institutions relate to each other, to 
understand their likelihood of experiencing fragility. 
 
11.  This paper uses the Polity IV Dataset typology to distinguish between 
various combinations of political institutions, ranging from what is 
commonly called democracy and autocracy.  Using the Polity IV Dataset 
(which collects and analyses data on political regimes around the world 
from 1955), academic research finds that states that have combinations of 
democratic and non-democratic institutions have historically shown 
exceptionally high risk of state failure.
5  Figure 1 shows the worldwide 
odds ratio of state failure against varying combinations of political 
institutions.  Clearly, those areas with partial democratic institutions (see 
Box 2 below) are much more prone to fragility than others.  If we look at 
the same findings only for Sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence is much more 
stark (see Figure 2). What is particularly interesting is how, according to 
this research, other factors such as trade openness, population density, 
                                            
4 Carothers (2002) 
5 Goldstone et al (2004) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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ethnic composition and rate of economic growth are much weaker 




Fig. 1: Relative importance of political institutions in state failure 




Fig. 2: Relative importance of political institutions in state failure 
(Sub-Saharan Africa), Source: Goldstone (2004) 
 
 
A.   What makes the institutional set-up weak? 
 
12.  Any state’s stability depends on a balance in its core political institutions 
that is self-enforcing.
6  In a democracy, a state’s institutions - whether the 
national police service, or the legal definition of property rights - transmit 
the rule of law.  This is the legal limit by which individual, collective and 
political activity is managed.  Where such institutions are governed openly 
and transparently they reinforce each other, providing the constraints on 
an executive, the so-called ‘checks and balances’, necessary for stability.  
 
                                            
6 Gates et al (2003) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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13.  Conversely, in areas where these institutions are continuously changing, 
or in a state of transition, (partial democracy and autocracies with some 
political competition and participation), there is only a weak system of 
institutional coherence, so that individual parts of that system fall open to 
abuse by powerful groups and interests.  In these areas there may often 
also be higher levels of illegal or informal activity as the population finds 
alternative means of support, bypassing the state institutions, which in 
many cases may be newer than traditional non-state ones.  In doing so, 
the institutions are further undermined.   
 
14.  Note that it is not the process of change itself that is synonymous with 
fragility (crises can allow more flexibility over policy choice, for better or 
worse outcomes) but rather the balance between a state’s institutions that 
will determine whether particular incidents or conditions destabilise the 
state.  
 
15.  In thinking about the balance of state institutions, we primarily refer to 
three key elements, which make up what we call political regimes (See 
box 2).   These are selection, control and participation: 
 
a.  Selection: the method of selecting and replacing the government 
leaders. This ranges from the most open (competitive elections) to 
the most closed (royal succession).  In between are mixed methods 
such as designation (a small group chooses its leaders without 
formal competition).  Finally there is self-selection through seizure 
of power, usually by force. 
 
b.  Control: the limits on the executive’s power by holding it 
accountable.  Some examples of checks and balances on executive 
behaviour include parliaments, a single state-party (i.e. Communist 
Party in China) or a separate judiciary. 
 
c.  Participation: the degree of involvement of the public in the 
political process.  It is assumed that participation is greater when 
there are relatively stable and enduring political groups (not 
necessarily parties), and that it is institutionalised when they 
regularly compete for national political influence.  Participation can 
be factional where intense, often violent, competition exists 
between those groups that hold power and those that do not.   
Restricted participation means there are persisting, institutionalised 
limits to the involvement of groups or individuals in the political life 
of a country. 
 
Where any one of these three elements of institutional set-up is more 
influential on a political system than the others, the state will show signs of 
fragility
7.  We examine why in the following sections. 
 
                                            
7 Please note that we refer to formal rules rather than specific current political reality, and we 
assume the central government has full control over the national territory and any local 
authorities. Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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16.  Several academic studies find that control and participation have a strong 
and positive effect on a state’s stability.  If the executive is subordinated or 
controlled by other levels of government and if political competition is 
institutionalised and functional, the relative odds of political instability are 
dramatically lower than they might be otherwise, even in unfavourable 
conditions.  Where these conditions are absent, even in contexts of 
growth, the relative odds of fragility are large.
8  According to the statistical 
research based on the Polity IV, democrats and dictators alike can create 
stable states; it is the weakness of the state’s institutions (authoritarian or 




  B.   How does an unchecked executive relate to weak institutions? 
 
17. Institutions establish and embody the rules and procedures for how a state 
is governed.  These include constraints on a ruling entity once it has 
                                            
8 Goldstone et al (2004). This model accurately identified 75% of state failures and 76% of the controls in the 
historical data. 
Box 2: Political regimes typology 
 
 
OPEN AND COMPETITIVE SELECTION OF POLITICAL LEADERS 
 
Strong full democracies 
(India, Costa Rica, Botswana) 
 
•  Highly institutionalised and cooperative political 
participation 
•  Executive is formally controlled by other government 
institutions 
 
Weak full democracies 
(Mexico, Romania, Philippines) 
 
•  Either an unconstrained executive power 
•  Or a restricted or factionalised participation 
 
Weak partial democracies 
(Indonesia, Cote d’Ivoire) 
 
•  Neither control on the executive power 
•  Nor cooperative/institutional participation 
 
LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS OR COMPETITION IN THE SELECTION OF LEADERS 
 
Strong partial democracies 
(Russia, Turkey) 
 
•  Either a degree of control over the executive 
•  Or a highly institutionalised and cooperative participation 
 
RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS OR COMPETITION IN SELECTION OF LEADERS 
 
Autocracies 
(Burma, North Korea) 
 
•  Executive is selected through succession, designation, 
self-selection or a mix 
•  Authority is not subordinate or constrained 
•  Political participation is highly restricted 
 
Autocracies with some 
competition  
(Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan) 
 
•  Limited space for political competition, although with little 
real power 
According to research based on the Polity IV dataset, political types in shade have a higher risk of political instability 
 Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
      11
gained power, as well as provision for how that body is selected in the first 
place.  In a full democracy, the legislative, executive and judicial arms of 
state structure have distinct shares of power, and are intended to reinforce 
each other; when power is separated into these three distinct areas, each 
institution acts as a counter-balance against any possible abuse of 
position from the others.  The result is state stability: the state has the 
ability to settle disputes and conflict peacefully, without recourse to 
violence.  Where the power distribution amongst these institutions is 
unequal, there will be no constraint against internal jostling for power, and 
each institution will be highly unstable as a result.  The result for the state 
is fragility.  It is particularly important to note that a lack of constraint on a 
state’s executive arm is much more critical for stability than the method in 
which those entities are selected.
9     
 
18. Effective states also depend on effective political leadership equipped with 
the skills to manage conflicting interests, agree effective policies, and see 
through structural change.  Where institutions are weak, personalities 
often dominate.  In the worst cases, predatory leaders unchecked by 




C.    How does limited political participation relate to weak 
institutions? 
 
19.  Where a state’s institutions are weak, the rules and procedures for 
selecting a ruling body will be undermined.  It is important to note here the 
distinction between the election process itself and participation in election 
processes.  Free and fair elections for a President or Prime Minister are 
not enough to ensure stability.  Indeed, elections themselves can be 
destabilising.  The nature of the election process (presidential or 
parliamentary system; ‘first past the post’; proportional representation) is 
shown to be much less important for stability than how far institutions are 
constrained to regulate access, authority and political competition.
11  If 
significant elements of the population are prevented from participating in 
electoral processes a state’s level of fragility will increase.  However, the 
point here is that expectations matter and that, in many fragile states, 
holding elections has a legitimising effect, particularly in post-conflict, 
transition situations.  They are ‘an important staging post, but not the 
finishing line’.
12  Donors and other external actors often push for and have 
overly positive expectations of elections, particularly in post conflict 
settings.  
 
20. Just as limited electoral participation can lead to fragility, so too can limited 
participation in wider political processes.  Weak institutions will be unable 
to prevent wider discrimination against individual societal groups.   
Effectively, this can mean that significant proportions of a population are 
                                            
9 Goldstone et al (2004),;Gates et al (2003) 
10 Rotberg (2004) 
11 Goldstone et al (2004); Cheibub & Limongi (2002) 
12 Kofi Annan, Speech at Banqueting House, Whitehall, 10 February 2005 Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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entirely excluded, not only from the leadership selection process, but from 
wider political representation as well.  At its most extreme, this exclusion 
can drive fragility, as large sections of the population express their 
grievances at not being represented through violence.   
 
21.  This is often evidenced in states with two large and roughly equal ethnic 
groups.  If one ethnic group is dominant across the political spectrum and 
discriminates against the other, that state is at a high risk of fragility.
13  
Exclusionary politics motivates discriminated groups to resist, which may 
in turn motivate ruling authorities to repress even further.   
 
22.  Reynal-Querol has developed a theoretical model that captures the links 
between political systems and rebellion, arguing that the more inclusive 
the system, the smaller the probability of fragility.
14  Conversely, there are 
several studies that show both that extremely diverse or homogeneous 
societies tend to be at a lower risk of conflict.
15  Note, however, the 
combination of factors at work here.  A country’s ethnic composition has 
no direct impact on stability.
16  Rather it is only when ethnic differences are 
combined with active political discrimination or mechanisms of social 
exclusion against particular groups that fragility is found.   
 
23.  This supports the findings shown earlier in Figures 1 and 2: it is not 
ethnicity that can drive fragility, but weak state institutions that cannot 












24.  It is worth mentioning a line of enquiry about the strength of state 
institutions that has focused on the legacy of colonialism.  The impact of 
European colonialism on states was significant in some cases, particularly 
in fragmented pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  External actors created 
structures that often conflicted with, or were superimposed onto, pre-
existing political institutions and forms of governance.  By ignoring 
customary sources of political authority, the newly-imposed state 
structures were undermined from their creation.
17  Since institutions were 
not embedded in domestic power relations, they lacked legitimacy and 
capacity.  And those working with the new institutional set-up would often 
accommodate it within traditional political relations by resorting to 
                                            
13 Collier (2003) 
14 Reynal-Querol (2002) 
15 Collier (2003) 
16 Goldstone et al (2004) 
17 Englebert (2000) 
Box 3: Kosovo 
 
Kosovo lost its Yugoslav status of provincial autonomy in 1989.  There followed 10 years of
discriminatory political practice which saw members of the majority ethnic Albanian population
systematically removed from positions of public office and state-owned enterprises.  The decade
was also characterised by little investment in any state infrastructure for the province.  After an initial
period of peaceful resistance, a violent rebellion force gained support: with little opportunity for
employment or economic development, and near complete lack of access to representation in the
official political institutions of the time, popular discontent turned to violence. Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
      13
patronage and what has been called the ‘hollowing out of the state’ in 
favour of particular interests, away from the notion of ‘national interest’.  
This means that state institutions are accountable only to the followers of 
those in power and that the legitimacy of the state derives from its ability to 
deliver resources to them. See Box 4. 
 
 
III.  Other drivers of fragility 
 
25.  There are three theories in the literature presented as factors associated 
with state fragility: the ‘cost-benefit analysis of insurgence’, the ‘role of 
economic performance’, and the so-called ‘modernisation theory’.  They 
are detailed below.  Each theory presents alternative contributing factors 
to fragility, some of which overlap with each other, such as economic 
development or violent conflict.   
 
26.  Some of these factors in themselves can drive fragility, whilst others are 
indirect drivers of fragility when combined with other factors.    
 
27.  Importantly, all of them can drive fragility when combined with weak state 
institutions which is why weak institutions are presented in this paper as 
the central driver of fragility.  None of the factors highlighted below is as 
central to fragility as weak institutions.  The three theories are:  
 
a.  The cost-benefit analysis of insurgence:  a political system is 
stable if no group can be better off by triggering a rebellion.
18  
However, in this theory, the focus on conflict as a causal 
characteristic does not take us very far along the explanatory 
causes of fragility: violent conflict may be a manifestation of 
politics by other means.  It does not necessarily tell us why 
political systems and institutions cannot manage tensions in a 
peaceful way.  
 
b.  The role of economic performance: a sudden dip in growth 
(evidenced by, say, the sudden onset of famine) or frustrated 
expectations around wealth creation may explain surges of 
                                            
18 Reynal-Querol (2002)  
Box 4: DRC  
 
The people of the Congo have been beset by a history of exploitative rule from the time of Leopold
to the present day.  At independence, there was a near total absence of Congolese-run democratic
institutions, setting the scene for the emergence of a state built on imposed institutions lacking
ownership and experience.  The result was the wholesale exploitation of wealth by those in power,
hollowing the state out of its natural resources for personal gain.  The country’s economy was
crippled, and state structures were characterised by the high levels of fragility that persist today.
After Mobutu’s fall in 1996, the country plunged into civil war, devastating the country’s potential still
further and leaving its people in one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world. Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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violent political discontent.
19  However, analysis carried out by 
the State Failure Task Force
20 indicates that growth and 
economic performance do not, in fact, have a significant effect 
on the risk of severe fragility.  
 
c.  The modernisation theory: as countries develop and become 
wealthier, increased demands for participation from the middle 
classes clash with exclusionary government leaders.
21  
However, this theory does not explain what role institutions play 
in driving fragility. 
 
28.  The factors relating to fragility presented in these theories include: (a) 
economic development, (b) natural resources, (c) a history of violent 
conflict, (d) transitions, (e) external shocks, (f) geography, climate & 
disease, and (g) the international system.  They are each examined in turn 
below. 
 
A.   Economic development 
 
29.  Today it is well understood that economic growth is a necessary condition 
for poverty reduction, but also that economies can only thrive in countries 
where there is peace, stability and good governance.  Economic growth 
cannot happen without strong institutions.  Variation in the quality of 
institutions is thought to be the primary explanation as to why some 
countries have experienced economic decline, whilst others with a 
previously similar level of income have prospered.
22  Most fragile states 
have weak institutions and consequently often experience a chronic lack of 
(both external and internal) investment in both human development and 
state infrastructure.  
 
30.  There are differing academic views on the nature and direction of the 
relationship between fragility and socio-economic development.  Some 
authors argue that economic growth can lead to increased fragility 
because growth entails substantial structural changes within state 
institutions.  These changes may undo political coalitions and induce 
painful readjustments in the balance of power among different interest 
groups.
23  Others suggest that fragility can force otherwise recalcitrant 
governments to undertake long-delayed reforms.
24  Whilst in the short-
term, such change may exacerbate fragility, in the long-term, strong 
political systems are able to rebalance.  The explanation for this disparity 
of views is that the emergence of fragility depends on other factors: 
economic decline itself does not necessarily cause a state to become 
fragile, but can contribute to fragility when combined with other drivers.  
                                            
19 Gurr (1974) 
20 Located within the Centre for International Development & Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. 
Established in 1994, the taskforce researches political conflict and regime crises, listing comparative data on cases of 
total and partial state failure between 1955 and 2000.  
21 Huntington (1968) 
22 Temple (1999)  
23 Campos and Nugent (2000) 
24 Campos, Nugent and Robinson (1999) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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Note that in both the arguments outlined above, levels of stability are 
related to the relative strength of state institutions.   
 
31.  But fragility can be associated with or indeed drive uncertainty, which can 
in turn have negative consequences for investment and economic activity 
in a country, therefore placing additional stress on already weak 
institutions.  Economic uncertainty will deter investment.  This can be 
compounded by the perception that state institutions lack legitimacy or 
cannot play the oversight function to ensure the rules of the game are 
applied fairly.  World Bank evidence shows that once a state enters low 
income status, it will remain there for 69 years.
25     
 
32.  To enable economic growth, a government must invest in its state 
infrastructure (for example, roads) and its people (for example through 
high quality education).
26  Whilst education and infrastructure in 
themselves are not sufficient to enable economic growth,
27 there is plenty 
of evidence to suggest that better-educated populations more easily 
sustain stability, independent of their level of economic development.
28   A 
possible explanation is the way in which wealth alters the incentives facing 
ruling entities: a high level of wealth reduces potential conflict over its 
distribution, as fewer people are left outside the social benefits drawn from 
the available resources.   
 
33.  Linked to this, with low levels of GDP, a state is less likely to be able to 
extend its reach into distant regions, either in terms of infrastructural 
investment or administrative presence.  Social dissatisfaction caused by 
poverty and the resulting lack of opportunity for growth may lead to 
insurgency campaigns that threaten the state.  In turn, the state is unlikely 
to have the resources to quell them, only strengthening the insurgents’ 
cause.  This is supported by findings that countries with mountainous 
regions are more prone to conflict than others.
29   The key issue here is 
not that the state in some areas is not present, but that a contender to the 
state fills a perceived power or service ‘gap’.  The fact that there is already 
a contender for state control is evidence in itself of fragility.  
 
34.  Figure 3 below shows that, even with all other contributing factors 
remaining constant (natural resources; diasporas; previous wars; strength 
of institutions), if a state averages a GDP per capita of US$ 250 or below, 
there is a 15% risk of seeing a civil war in the following five years.
30  Yet, 
this risk level is reduced to below 1% if GDP per capita reaches over US$ 
5,000. 
 
                                            
25 Chauvet, Collier (2004) 
26 Temple (1999) 
27 Investment in equipment is a means of transferring technology and ideas into concrete action, but the investment 
must be put to productive use if it is to contribute to wealth creation.  Similarly, people must be productively employed 
if education is to contribute to increasing output. 
28 Przeworski et al (2000) 
29 Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
30 Collier/Hoeffler Model.   Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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Fig. 3: Risk of civil war and GDP per capita, 1960-1999 
 
 
35.  Reinforcing this, Przeworski et al provide data linking the likelihood of 
transition from democracy and autocracy (and vice versa) to the prevailing 
level of economic development between 1950-1990.  Their findings 
suggest that democracies will prove to be fragile in poor economies, but 
become increasingly less so at progressively higher levels of economic 
development, i.e. that wealthier nations can much better and more easily 
sustain democratic institutions.  Perhaps most strikingly, they find that no 
democratic state system with a per capita income above approximately 
US$ 6,000 has ever fallen.
31  To put it another way: people are much less 
likely to fight if they have something to lose.
32  Similarly, the research 
shows that autocracies are relatively stable at low- and high-income levels 
but most unstable at intermediate levels of economic development, as 
expectations rise among an emergent middle-class.  
 
36.  However, it should be stressed that whilst there is strong evidence of 
poverty being associated with fragility, it does not necessarily trigger 
violent conflict.  As we saw above, violent conflict occurs in areas of low 
GDP per capita, combined with state institutions that are unable to 
manage the natural tensions in society.  Whilst weak institutions can cause 
economic decline and poverty, and thereby fragility, the process is self-
reinforcing, with levels of poverty and economic decline themselves further 
weakening state institutions.  Institutionally weak states will also often 
witness high levels of corruption, and the diversion of state resources for 
the personal gain of the few.
33   
 
37.  Low levels of GDP per capita are associated with reduced state capacity.  
If a state cannot raise revenue from its population in order to provide 
public services for that population, it will be weakened.  The state can 
neither provide services to those in most need, nor invest in the 
infrastructure needed to promote economic growth: its institutions lack the 
                                            
31 Przeworski et al (2000) 
32 See also Lipset (1959) 
33 de Soysa (2002) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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capacity to improve; they are weak.  In turn, the population will either seek 
alternative methods for provision, bypassing the state and thereby 
undermining it in the process, or dissatisfied elements of society may seek 
to assume control from the state, and begin a campaign of violence to 
achieve this.  If the state cannot provide for all of its population, those 
working in the public sector may seek to retain their positions through 
patronage.  In many countries, working for the state is seen as a means 
simply to provide for your family and friends.  This is likely to entrench the 
weak capacity problems and strengthen the cycle of fragility of state 
institutions.  
 
B.   Natural resources 
 
38.  Violence in fragile states is often triggered by competition for resources, 
such as land or water.  Obvious cases where high levels of natural 
resource supply have contributed to the onset of conflict include DRC (see 
earlier example), Sierra Leone, Angola, and Sudan.  However, it is not the 
presence of natural resources in a country that will necessarily spark 
violence – certainly, it is possible to find conflicts where natural resources 
do not play a role (Nepal, Senegal, Bosnia and Lebanon).
34  And not all 
natural resource rich countries have experienced fragility (Canada, 
Botswana).    
 
39.  Instead, violent conflict is usually sparked by the political manipulation of 
groups competing for power (including control of natural resource supply). 
Large supplies of natural resource wealth provide strong incentives for 
those with access to the supplies to skew the distribution of wealth through 
patronage.  Often that access is granted to members of an incumbent 
regime, to use as they please.  In turn, there can be a powerful incentive 
for opposition parties to resort to illegal methods of bringing about change, 
through rioting or even coups.  But again, we see that in such cases it is 
not the presence of natural resources themselves, but how those in power 
use those resources.  Apart from oil, natural resources are generally less 
important in the onset of conflict than in determining its duration.
35   
 
C. Violent  conflict 
 
40.  Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of a breakdown in 
communication and negotiation between conflicting groups, and the most 
destructive aspect of any development process.  However, violent conflict 
is often viewed simply as a result, rather than a driver of fragility.  Yet there 
is plenty of evidence to show that violent conflict is in itself a self-
reinforcing process that contributes to a lack of stability.   
 
                                            
34 Collier et al (2003)  
35 Ross (2003a); Ross (2003b) Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
      18
 




41.  Civil war is now by far the most common form of violent conflict, with an 
average of two or three civil wars igniting each year since the 1950s.  The 
number of ongoing wars steadily increased from this time until the early 
1990s when the number finally began to fall (see Figure 4).   
 
42.  In almost every cross-country analysis of civil war since the 1950s, there 
are three factors most consistently associated with triggers of violent 
conflict: poverty; a recent history of conflict; and weak institutions.
37  We 
have already examined the reasons why weak institutions and poverty 
drive fragility leading to a risk of conflict.       
 
43.  Other factors have also been associated with triggers of conflict, such as 
natural resources; the size of a state’s diaspora; the extent of dominance 
by one ethnic group in a state; and trade openness.
38  Still further factors 
exist, likely to play a contributing role to the start of war, but are yet to be 
researched comprehensively.  These include: inequality; international 
drivers of conflict; and arms proliferation.  Each of these factors, in 
themselves, is unlikely to trigger violence, but often there is evidence to 
show that various combinations of any of the above factors can lead to 
violence.  This section looks at recent history of conflict as a factor that 
drives fragility.   
 
44.  Today, in countries emerging from conflict, there is approximately a 30% 
risk of a return to conflict within five years.
39  There are several 
explanations, and once again we see that they are closely connected to 
other drivers of fragility.  Firstly, civil war weakens a state’s institutions and 
increases poverty.  As institutions direct attention towards the conflict that 
has arisen, they are normally placed under extreme stress and are less 
able to provide for the population; as a result, service delivery will suffer. 
 
45. Second, violent conflict can reduce levels of GDP per capita due to lack of 
production and corresponding reduced investment (both internal and 
                                            
36 Collier et al (2003) 
37 Collier, Hoeffler (2001); Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
38 de Soysa (2003); State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings (2000) 
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external), so that once a conflict has begun, raising levels of GDP 
becomes an even harder outcome. Some wealth-creating resources will 
become entrenched in a few hands, and levels of informal or illegal activity 
may flourish.  
 
46.  Next, during a conflict, social tensions are highlighted and take time to 
overcome.  Politicians and social groups can easily manipulate people’s 
identities and sense of loyalty during wartime.  And any (perceived or real) 
inequality may well be made much more stark as a result of atrocities 
committed during times of war.  This has ramifications for longer-term 
fragility.  Ethnicity in itself is shown to have no direct impact on stability, 
but when ethnic differences are combined with active political 
discrimination, stability declines (see earlier box on Kosovo).




Fig. 5: Relationship between strength of state institutions and civil war
41 
 
47. There is plenty of evidence to show that high quality, established and well-
performing institutions can prevent fragility and, by extension, violent 
conflict.  We have already seen how ‘partial democracies’ are the least 
stable political system, i.e. the least likely to remain the same in the future.  
And following from this, there is strong evidence that the newness of a 
state, or its proximity to independence, is a strong factor associated with 
civil war.
42  There is supportive evidence showing the correlation between 
stability and conflict, whereby autocracies and full democracies are at a 
much lower risk of civil war than those states with mixed democratic 
systems of government.
43  See Figure 5 above. 
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48. Political systems and state institutions survive by acquiring legitimacy from 
the people they govern: without some legitimacy they will not be self-
sustaining into the long-term.  The age of institutions can have a 
legitimising effect as public expectations adapt to a history of state 
performance.  This goes some way to explain why autocracies prove so 
durable:
44 if services are provided consistently, even if the state authority 
is enforced through coercion, the population will not necessarily seek to 
change those structures.  Similarly, where the state has consistently failed 
to provide services for its population, people stop expecting to have 
services delivered, and work around existing structures to provide for 
themselves. 
 
49.  In contrast, where state institutions are in transition, having previously 
provided for the population, the state is likely to be much more fragile.
45  
The source of this fragility lies in the discontent the public may feel as their 
service provision is no longer reliable, and/or their participation in political 
affairs is curtailed from that to which they were previously accustomed.   
 
50.  Similarly, transitions from military rule, be it to more or less democratic 
forms of civilian government, raise two specific challenges.  One is the 
possibility of a return to military rule, as a new civilian administration may 
be perceived as too weak to govern effectively.  The other is military 
expectations and their understanding of their role in a new political system.  
If a military body does not recognise the new political system as legitimate, 
it has the resources on hand to respond violently if it chooses.
46     
 
51.  Finally, political systems that are in transition from historical autocracy to 
fledgling democracy may become unsettled by an increasing number of 
political demands.  It may take time for such groups to mobilise, meaning 
that in the initial transition phase resentment builds towards new actors 
trying to use the system to have their demands met.
47  Several authors 
have found evidence that fragility peaks around the second election after 
the opening up of political participation for this reason.
48  The interpretation 
may be that some level of freedom is actually required to let groups 
organise and that this, coupled with a new political setting, may provide 
incentives to such groups to do politics by other means. 
 
E. External  shocks 
 
52.  States do not operate in isolation, so will certainly be affected by events in 
neighbouring countries.  The more extreme the event, the more likely it will 
impact on its neighbours.  If a state has weak institutions from the outset, 
and particularly where there are marked social divisions (compounded with 
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minimal public participation in political processes), external shocks can 
trigger fragility.  This was clear in the Balkans’ recent history as conflict 
spread through Slovenia to Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and eventually 
Macedonia.  Similarly, current fragility in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi is 
compounded by the continuing neighbouring conflict in Eastern DRC.   
 
53.  Sudden deteriorations in terms of trade, not only domestically but also for 
a neighbouring state, can be destabilising.  If a state is reliant on one crop, 
and the market price falls overnight, the ramifications will be felt not only in 
the state in question, but further afield as well.  It is estimated that once a 
state reaches LICUS status, a neighbouring state will lose 2% of their 
annual growth rate.  At the same time, two thirds of the economic damage 
caused by reaching LICUS status will accrue to neighbours rather than to 
the LICUS state itself.
49 
 
F.   Geography, climate and disease 
 
54.  A state’s geographic location can drive fragility due to its association with 
economic decline and with additional stress being placed on already weak 
state systems.  States with no access to the sea tend to have lower GDPs 
than those that do, controlling for other factors, since it is more difficult to 
export products and attract inward investment.  In addition, if a state’s land 
is largely mountainous, harsh terrain that proves difficult to cultivate, the 
population will find it difficult to be self-sufficient and may have to rely on 
food imports, again preventing economic growth.  Adverse climate 
conditions or a predisposition to natural hazards (earthquakes or floods for 
example) will have similar consequences: harsh weather can destroy 
crops, and make land difficult to cultivate, and natural hazards can mean 
that, overnight, any physical development or state investment in 
infrastructure can be destroyed. 
 
55.  Similarly, both geography and climate can mean that a state has a higher 
prevalence of disease than elsewhere, amongst both its population and its 
livestock.  There is a growing body of evidence that some contagious 
diseases, notably HIV/AIDS, are so widespread that they are having (or 
will have) a negative effect on a state’s capacity to run itself, even in 
places with strong institutions.  In Southern Africa, many countries face 
economic decline unless they bring their HIV/AIDS epidemics under 
control; certainly, on current trends, the numbers of teachers and other 
public servants within the next forty years will not be able to meet 
demand.
50  All such factors will contribute to fragility: a workforce reduced 
in capacity by illness cannot contribute to the benefits of any state 
investment in infrastructure.  Similarly, a less productive population will 
mean the state is unable to collect its maximum potential revenue, either 
through export income or fiscal returns.  In turn, the state institutions will 
be weakened as detailed above.   
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56. In the past, evidence has suggested that these effects are only relevant as 
drivers of fragility in the short-term.  In longer time periods, geographical 
and climatic effects on the quality of institutions can be taken into account 
and worked around, as in landlocked and dry Botswana.  
 
G.  The international system 
 
57. Donors and outside agencies, including multinational corporations, are 
also part of a state’s political economy.  These political relations determine 
the kinds of reforms that are likely to work and whether or not they will 
have any impact on fragility and poverty.
51  Most donors and other external 
actors will not, of course, openly seek to drive fragility through their 
actions, but there is growing recognition that some aspects of the current 
international response to weak states play no part in reversing fragility and 
may indeed contribute to it.  
 
58.  Badly-designed attempts to carry out democratisation and the withdrawal 
of support and funding before institutions have been adequately built up in 
capacity, can sharply increase the likelihood that a country will face violent 
political turmoil.
52  Simply holding free elections for the government, 
without achieving these other conditions, creates partial and weak 
democracies that we have already seen are more prone to fragility than 
any other kind of political system. The departure of the international 
community from an area of intervention can undermine domestic efforts to 
counter fragility.   
 
59.  Whilst it is impossible to hypothesise about ‘what might have been’, most 
observers agree that, in the case of Haiti in particular, the continued 
inadequacy of the international response contributed in some way to the 














60.  The difficulties of establishing a sustainable, functioning state in Haiti are 
certainly due to more than an inadequate international response.  Other 
factors are associated with such difficulties, most importantly institutional 
weakness, as well as a history of recent conflict, intractable politics and 
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52 Goldstone et al (2004) 
Box 5: Haiti 
 
UN involvement in Haiti began in 1990, and escalated in 1994 with the arrival of 20,000 US troops
under a mandate from the UN Security Council.  The next ten years witnessed a total of 8 different
missions, all characterised by funding difficulties and a reluctance by Member States to authorise
troops to support the international civilian presence.  Each mission was limited in mandate in terms
of both duration and focus which meant that whilst democracy of sorts was restored, there was little
room to promote long-term, sustainable development. As a result, the return on over a decade of
military intervention, diplomatic effort, financial aid and technical assistance was virtually nil.  Of
course, UN missions only represent one aspect of international involvement; donor countries also
contributed bilaterally. But the Haiti missions are a good example of how inadequate international
responses can undermine efforts to establish a well-functioning state. Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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unfavourable social and economic structures.
53  This reinforces the 
evidence that promotion of institutional reform must be much more long-
term in vision than has previously been supported by donors.  The 
evidence is clear that it is not enough just to support and/or fund an 
electoral process and then leave a new system of government and state 
institutions to develop independently.  Instead, much longer-term 
engagement, with realistic expectations for the pace of development is 
needed.   
 
61.  In terms of development assistance, there is increasing evidence that not 
enough aid has been provided to fragile states and that it has been largely 
targeted in ineffective ways.  With limited capacity for reform, such states 
are unable effectively to meet donor terms and conditions.  Chauvet & 
Collier highlight the destabilising impact that unreliable funding streams 
can have.  If aid is suddenly withdrawn as part of a change in strategic 
direction from bilateral donors, it can mean that some states, in a very 
short space of time, have little access to resources with which to provide 
services.
54  Similarly, there is plenty of evidence to show that policies will 
be more beneficial if they are developed locally, rather than imposed from 
outside.  The World Bank’s experiences in Latin America and Africa, 
where enormous pressure was exerted on governments to follow policy 
objectives developed in Washington, are used as evidence of this.  Their 
results contrasted sharply with the success witnessed in East Asia where 
institutional innovations relied on local developments and capacity.
55   
 
62.  There is evidence that some features of the current international trade 
system (in particular the protection of developed countries’ markets) act as 
a serious constraint on economic growth for poor countries.  Economic 
growth, as we have seen, is not the only prerequisite for escaping fragility, 
but it can play an important role in strengthening a state’s institutions.   
Protection in the north has been reduced substantially over the past thirty 
years, but it remains significant for the sorts of products most poor 
countries are trying to export (mainly agriculture- and labour-intensive 
industrial products, in which poor countries often have a comparative 
advantage).  The IMF and World Bank estimate that the gains to 
developing countries from eliminating all barriers to merchandise trade 
would be in the order of US$ 80-180bn a year.  This is more than twice the 
annual flow of aid to these countries.
56   
 
63.  The significance of these barriers should not be underestimated, as 
Guyana’s dependency on sugar preferences shows to this day.  There is 
evidence to suggest that reducing access to markets for products or 
commodities involving large numbers of people makes it harder for 
countries to diversify away from their principal potential source of income.  
These tend to be natural resources, and are often controlled by only a 
narrow group of people, with a resulting vested interest in maintaining the 
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status quo.  This brings us back to the evidence that power jostling for the 
control of natural resource supplies can lead to fragility. 
 
IV. Conclusion:  policy  implications 
 
64.  This section tries to address the question of how DFID and other donors 
can tackle fragile states through a better understanding of what makes 
states fragile in the first place.  If donor responses are going to address a 
lack of political will as well as a lack of capacity, the international 
community needs to have a clearer understanding of the reasons for state 
failure.  As stated at the beginning of the paper, these will obviously vary 
from place to place, but it is still possible to derive a set of generic policy 
implications and operational recommendations.  
 
65. Basing our understanding of the drivers of fragility on evidence also means 
that it is important to highlight what is not linked to fragility.  Much recent 
academic research finds that there is no causal relation between factors 
such as inflation or military expenditure and fragility.
57  But donors/partner 
governments do need to assess the economic impact of reforms and, in 
turn, the impact on the political economy on a case-by-case basis. 
 
66.  DFID has defined fragile states as those either unable or unwilling to 
provide core services to its people, including the poor.  We categorise 
fragile states as ‘weak but willing’; ‘strong but unresponsive’; and ‘weak-
weak’.  Therefore, our response should be nuanced to each of these 
environments.  Some drivers, such as violent conflict, are likely to be 
exacerbated in ‘unwilling’ countries, states where the international donor 
community has no or very limited engagement.  Capacity constraints are 
also likely to add particular challenges in neutralising or diminishing the 
importance of other drivers of fragility, such as economic decline.  
 
67. In the past, donors have tried to promote change through technical 
solutions supported by individual champions of reform, believing the 
problem to be technical and not political.  However, today there is growing 
recognition of the need to understand the political incentives and the 
institutions that affect the prospects for reform. Donors and other external 
actors have a role to play in altering some of these incentive structures, 
even if only minimally. 
 
68.  There are almost always multiple factors that affect state institutions and 
drive fragility.  Many of these factors reinforce and overlap with each other.  
It is this incidence of overlap that makes weak institutions the most 
important factor in driving fragility.  This is not to say that other drivers are 
any less dramatic in their potential impact, but just that weak institutions 
can be cited as contributory in most examples of state fragility.   
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69. This has policy implications for DFID: support weak institutions and fragility 
can be prevented.  This has been recognised in the past as part of DFID’s 
governance agenda, but the extent to which the strengthening of a state’s 
political institutions has formed part of a poverty reduction strategy has not 
until now been fully appreciated.  
 
70.  The mechanism for selecting representatives (i.e. how the political system 
is formed through an election process) is less important in determining a 
state’s long-term stability than the institutions that manage a state for the 
length of any political cycle.  This also has policy significance: donors are 
frequently more interested in concrete results and therefore tend to target 
their contributions towards electoral assistance and monitoring.  Yet we 
have seen that their contribution must extend beyond election day to 
ensure longer-term stability.  This is not to say that assistance in the 
conducting of free and fair elections is not a valid use of donor funds.  But, 
particularly in fragile states, this assistance must be continued into the 
longer-term to ensure that those representatives elected are supported 
through a process of strengthening state institutions.  Donors should not 
assume that this will be easy, but certainly must recognise that without 
such longer-term support, they contribute only towards establishing a 
‘partial’ democracy with a high probability of future fragility and possibly 
state failure.  
 
71.  Much of the literature looks at fragility from the macro perspective, by 
focusing on the long-term structure and the mechanisms associated with 
the institutional set-up.  But short-term issues around timing, escalation 
and the nature of politics are also key when assessing the risks of fragility.  
Such a micro perspective can yield information on whether there are 
processes that are actually increasing the risk of fragility, even if 
institutions look the same from the outside.  Basically, the objective is to 
understand social processes and how they interact with formal political 
institutions.   
 
72.  A country such as Nepal, for example, has shifted in the space of ten 
years or so from a situation where there has been political will but low 
capacity to reduce poverty towards one where there is lack of both 
capacity and will and where there is open conflict with the Maoists.  DFID’s 
response has been to explore different service delivery arrangements (i.e. 
by partnering with non state actors), while at the same time remaining 
engaged with state structures to support reforms which aim to promote 
more socially inclusive and high impact service delivery interventions.  The 
range of partners is different depending on whether the focus of attention 
is a rural, urban, or contested area. 
 
73. Given fragile states contain only 14% of the world’s population but nearly a 
third of the world’s poor people and 41% of all child deaths, poverty has 
particular significance as a driver of fragility.  In the past, resources 
directed to fragile states have been concentrated towards the provision of 
humanitarian assistance or the strengthening of only a limited set of Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
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institutions, particularly financial.  We now see that a much broader 
agenda for strengthening institutions must come into play.     
 
74.  While increasing levels of economic development can have substantial 
effects in reducing the risks of various crises, the centrality of political 
institutions remains paramount.  Economic development is not a 
requirement for stability: even if conditions of development and trade are 
favourable, the relative odds of state fragility can remain high in areas 
where state institutions are weak.  
 
75.  The main assumption on which we base the following policy 
recommendations is that external actors can help shape institutions, 
particularly in fragile states.  Why?  Because fragility suggests a strong 
likelihood that both internal and external pressures will result in significant 
or abrupt changes.   
 
76. There have been several areas highlighted in this paper where donors can 
improve their assistance to fragile states.  Trade barriers prevent 
opportunities for economic growth; aid allocation has until now been 
inadequate, and the funding of elections in the place of substantial longer-
term support to institutions can all contribute to drive fragility.  Of course, 
any intervention will only ever be marginal in comparison with the 
processes that go on domestically.  But external actors have a 
responsibility to ensure their assistance is responsible.  Below are some 
specific recommendations by type of driver. 
 
A.  Some operational recommendations 
 
77. Weak institutions need to be better tackled.  Institution building needs 
to be addressed much more strategically than in the past.  This is broader 
than current programmes that concentrate on financial management and 
accountability systems, but should be part of a wider strategy to promote 
good governance and improved administrative capacity across a state’s 
civil service.  The importance of ‘good enough governance’
58 should be 
promoted as a means of achieving impact and change in fragile states.   
 
78. Selection: Elections are the start of a wider process.  DFID support to 
election processes must form the beginning phase only of a wider process 
of institutional reform.  An aspect of the debate around democratic values 
and accountability that is often overlooked by donors and other external 
partners is that this form of political system only works when contenders 
for office are more or less in agreement over core values, aspirations and 
interests.  They may differ over strategies, but most (if not all) political 
actors are broadly agreed on common goals.  The problem is that in fragile 
states many political platforms (formal or informal) represent either 
fundamentally irreconcilable visions for society or see politics strictly as a 
                                            
58 This much-used expression, originally coined by Merilee Grindle, basically asserts that governance reforms need 
to be prioritised, achievable, and appropriate to context.  In fragile states the goal is to promote effective states 
fulfilling the most basic functions.  See: Grindle, M (2002) ‘Good enough governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform 
in Developing Countries’, Harvard University Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
      27
zero-sum game over distribution of power and resources.  Donors and 
others need to stop assuming that stabilisation of fragile states through 
democratisation and a brief push for accountability is enough to produce 
governments devoted to interests compatible with their own, and focused 
around poverty reduction.  A careful assessment of risks needs to be 
considered before providing election support.  Any electoral funding should 
be embedded in a wider governance or state-building programme. 
 
79. Control & Participation: Focus on the two stabilising aspects of 
regimes.  The first is subordination or control over the executive’s 
authority and the second is managing and establishing effective political 
competition.  Donors and external actors should support national 
reformers to concentrate in strengthening both or one, depending on 
country context.  Again, the establishment of political competition to 
existing policies or reform programmes will not (necessarily) find support 
so that opposition to such activity should be expected.  But possible work 
might include capacity building support to civil society and media 
organisations in advocacy, or monitoring and advice through technical 
support to the civil service.  
 
80.  Providing support to institutions designed to control the executive is an 
area where DFID has much experience, including in the justice and police 
sectors, anti-corruption, and decentralisation, to name a few.  The 
challenge in most fragile states is the extent of the need that exists due to 
particularly limited capacity.  In such environments, there is a danger that 
donors may ‘smother’ governments in fragile states with an endless list of 
reforms, when little capacity exists to address even the bare minimum 
being required by donors.  It must be recognised that not all governance 
concerns need to or can be addressed at the same time.   
 
81.  The drivers analysis tells us that a better understanding of the causes of 
fragility in a country can help prioritise and sequence activities.  In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, many governance reforms 
will not be effective until the thorny issue of the Congolese army (and an 
improved level of security and territorial control) is resolved.  
 
82. Political institutions and conflict: transitions are crucial. Democracies, 
even fully-fledged, are less likely to withstand internal tensions that lead to 
widespread internal conflict if they are institutionally weak with regard to 
executive constraints or the regulation of political competition.  Transitions 
to increased competition without strengthening these two other key 
aspects of state structure enormously increase the risks of state weakness 
and failure.  The implication is that external actors should step up 
assistance into the longer-term across the board to avoid the 
establishment of highly unstable regime types.  In practice, this means that 
if support is provided at the political level in the form of electoral 
assistance or political party advice, it should be ensured that technical 
assistance, either training or advisory, should also be provided both to civil 
service departments (at all levels) and to civil society groups. 
 Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile? 
      28
83. Effective states also need ‘inclusive institutions’ that respect the 
interests of the wider population and are more likely to benefit the poor.  In 
the long run, stable and effective states are those in which government 
policies and public institutions are able to generate public support.  But in 
fragile states a basic level of commitment to poverty reduction is to provide 
broad-based services to the population without institutionalised 
discrimination directed at particular groups.   
 
84. Economic development: Poverty reduction must be promoted at the 
same time as institutional reform.  Economic factors do certainly affect 
fragility, but they generally have less of an impact than weak institutions.  It 
is also clear that poverty can be a driver of fragility so that poverty 
reduction activities should be viewed as important for preventing fragility.  
The policy implication is that poverty reduction goes beyond pure 
economic development to broader support for institutional capacity 
building into the longer-term.  Activities might include the promotion of 
micro-credit enterprise or small-scale agricultural support, where possible 
led by partner government agencies.  Monitoring and evaluation should be 
institutionalised within programmes to ensure continuing effectiveness. 
 
85. Violent conflict: Prevention and peacebuilding activities should be 
seen in a broader context than simple stabilisation.  Haiti is a good 
example of where piecemeal international intervention over more than a 
decade proved inadequate to ensure longer-term stability.   
 
86. External organisations can also be a positive force for good. Many of 
the triggers of and solutions to fragility lie beyond the boundaries of a 
country.  Regional relationships – and institutions – are important.  One 
example of a regional approach is the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Protocol, which is tasked with building Africa’s peacekeeping capacity.   
More can be done to look at fragile states in cross-border ways: either as 
whole regions or as sub-regions, such as the border area encompassing 
Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan.  It is at this level that supporting 
civil society may be an effective and sometimes the only possible 
intervention.  Non-state actors may be more innovative in taking cross-
border approaches to poverty reduction and conflict prevention.  Many 
initiatives straddle both the international and regional levels of response.  
For example, poor governance in the developing world can be facilitated 
by the services regulated in the developed world, such as money 
laundering.  Understanding the main causes of fragility can help donors 
and other international actors to respond to state fragility both in-country 
and in the external environment. 
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